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TORTS AS THE UNION OF LIBERTY AND EFFICIENCY:
AN ESSAY ON CAUSATION
ROBERT COOTER*
INTRODUCTION
In a well-known essay the philosopher Bertrand Russell observed
that "cause" tends to disappear from science.' In a mature science, ac-
cording to Russell, precise mathematical relationships link the variables.
A variety of relationships among variables are recognized in mathemat-
ics, such as functional relationships (y = f(x) or "y is a function of x"),
but there is no relationship in mathematics called a causal relationship.
According to Russell, the disappearance of "cause" from scientific dis-
course and its replacement by precise mathematical terms is evidence of
scientific progress.
Economic models of tort law are based on functional relationships
among such variables as the probability of accidents, the harm they
cause, and precaution against them. Being mathematical relationships,
they are not explicitly causal (although they are implicitly), so Russell's
observation that "cause" disappears is apparently true of the economic
analysis of tort law. In tort law, however, causality is a necessary condi-
tion for liability in most cases. In so far as the formal models describe
tort law, the legal concept of cause must be imbedded in the math. How
is legal cause imbedded in formal models? Do the formal models clarify
difficult legal issues about causation, as concluded by such writers as Cal-
abresi, Shavell, and Landes and Posner?2  Is the disappearance of
"cause" from the formal models evidence of scientific progress and a rea-
son for celebration, as Russell's views suggest? Or do the formal models
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. B.A. 1967, Swarthmore College; B.A.
1969, Oxford University; Ph.D. 1975, Harvard University. I would like to thank Steve Sugarman
and Richard Wright for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. Russell, On the Notion of Cause in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 13
(1912-13). Von Wright summarizes the article:
In a forceful and influential essay from the beginning of the century Bertrand Russell ar-
gued that, as a category of scientific thought, causality was becoming obsolete and was in
the process of being replaced by notions of functional relationship. The lingering on of
causal talk in the writing of philosophers was to be labelled a sort of atavism.
G. VON WRIGHT, CAUSALITY AND DETERMINISM 3 (1974).
2. G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the
Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975); Landes & Posner,
Causation in Tort Law. An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109 (1983); Shavell, An Analysis
of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980).
523
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
obscure legal cause and suppress interesting legal issues, as asserted by
critics such as Wright?3
This article tries to answer these questions by explaining the rela-
tionship between liberty and efficiency. A boundary exists between per-
sonal freedom and responsibility to others. The boundary is crossed
when one person causes harm to another. Causation in tort law is, thus,
a way of describing the point where personal freedom runs out and re-
sponsibility to others begins. An account of causation in tort law is nec-
essarily an account of a society's conception of liberty.
This account of causation in torts, or accounts similar to it, has been
advanced by opponents of the economic analysis of law as a way of refut-
ing it. 4 What opponents have failed to notice is the natural link between
liberty and Pareto efficiency, which is the fundamental normative con-
cept in contemporary economics. A change is a Pareto improvement by
definition if it makes at least one person better off and no one worse off,
where "better off" and "worse off" are measured relative to an initial
distribution of resources. 5 In efficiency models of the law, the initial dis-
tribution of resources includes basic rights such as those protected by
tort law. A non-economic theory is required to explain and justify the
basic tort rights that constitute a society's conception of liberty. The
efficiency analysis treats these basic rights as part of the initial distribu-
tion of resources against which Pareto improvements are measured. So
answers to some of the deepest questions in tort law are presupposed,
rather than supplied, by the efficiency analysis.
Once these answers are supplied, however, the efficiency models
have much to contribute to tort law. The purpose of efficiency models of
law is to discover Pareto improvements and explain how courts can make
them. A Pareto improvement increases the value of the initial distribu-
tion of resources. The efficiency analysis of torts thus presupposes the
specification of the basic rights and then shows how to increase their
value as measured by the preferences of the people who enjoy them. I
understand most economic models of law to be based upon the union of
3. Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 435 (1985) [hereinafter Wright I]. See also Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAI-IF.
L. REV. 1735 (1985) [hereinafter Wright II].
4. Liberty is explicitly discussed in Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973). See also H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (lst ed. 1959) [hereinaf-
ter HART & HONOR-]; Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972);
Wright I, supra note 3.
5. Pareto efficiency is a standard topic in microeconomic text books. See. e.g., E. MANSFIELD,
MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 367 (3d ed. 1979). For a mathematically rigorous
treatment, see H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 215 (1978).
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liberty and efficiency. This understanding provides the best answers for
questions of causation in tort law.
Part I of this article contains a brief explanation of the conventional
ideas of cause in tort law. Part II offers a detailed explanation of the idea
of cause in efficiency models of tort law. Finally, Part III develops the
conception of torts as the union of liberty and efficiency.
I. CAUSE IN TORT LAW 6
The idea of causation may seem simple-perhaps an image comes to
mind of billiard balls colliding with each other-but this impression is
misleading. To illustrate some complications, suppose a psychiatrist says
that a young woman's suicide was caused by her childhood seduction, or
an economist says that devaluation caused inflation, or a minister says
that God caused an earthquake. These uses of "cause" are far more
problematic than colliding billiard balls. There is, in fact, a long philo-
sophical tradition of distinguishing various types of causes. Aristotle, for
example, distinguished four types of causes. 7 Tort theorists have also
distinguished various types of causes, but the courts are content to limit
themselves to two types in most cases. The first and more comprehensive
of these is "cause-in-fact," and the second is "proximate cause."
A. Cause-In-Fact
The law borrows words from common speech and gives them a
technical meaning. To distinguish between the plain meaning and the
technical meaning, lawyers append to a word the phrase "in fact" or "in
law." The appendage "in fact" indicates that the word should be given
its plain meaning, whereas the appendage "in law" indicates it should be
given a special legal meaning. Cause-in-fact as a condition of recovery
thus implies that the plaintiff cannot recover unless the defendant
"caused" the accident according to the word's plain meaning. Establish-
ing that the defendant's act was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's harm is
a necessary condition (but not a sufficient condition) for the plaintiff's
recovery in most cases.
6. This section is based upon R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AN!) ECONOMICS ci. 8 (1988).
7. The four types of causes are the material cause, the formal cause, the efficient cause. and the
final cause. The doctrine of the four types of cause is quite subtle and complicated. See Moravcsik.
Aristotle on Adequate Explanation, 28 SYNTHESE 3 (1974). The Greek word 'aitia" apparently had
broader meaning than the English word -cause." Vlastos suggested that "aitia" was used in any
context where English speakers use "because," which includes circumstances under which the expla-
nation makes reference to reasons rather than causes. See G. VI.ASTOS. PLATONIC STUDIES 76-110
(2d ed. 1981). 1 am grateful to Alan Code for these citations.
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The requirement of cause-in-fact has procedural significance that
often controls the outcome of cases. Matters of fact are decided by the
jury, or by the judge if there is no jury, in the first court to hear the case.
In contrast, matters of law are decided by judges, especially in appellate
courts. Insofar as cause-in-fact is the root of liability, the crucial deter-
mination in cases will be made in trial courts, often by juries.8
A legal theory that attributes liability on the basis of cause as deter-
mined by its plain meaning suffers from the ambiguity of ordinary lan-
guage. The ambiguity of ordinary language is revealed in cases that are
beyond the usual range of the word's application. (Such unusual cases
are discussed in a subsequent section.) The problem cases cannot be clar-
ified by scrutinizing the plain meaning of "cause" because these cases are
exactly the ones in which the criteria that control the word's plain mean-
ing fail to give definite guidance.
One response to problem cases is to build a legal theory that will
clarify the plain meaning of "cause" and extend its range. Epstein, build-
ing on the earlier work of Hart and Honor6, tries to accomplish this goal
by reducing causal attribution to a small number of paradigm cases. 9
Hard cases are approached by testing their fit with the paradigms. To
illustrate, a batsman hit an unusually long cricket ball that cleared a
fence and struck a woman. When she sued, the British courts (and sub-
sequent commentators) struggled with the case, and eventually found
that she could not recover because there was no negligence on the part of
anyone, including the cricket club. Epstein, however, reached a different
conclusion by applying his method. One of the basic paradigms of tort,
according to Epstein, is "A hit B."' 0 The case fits the paradigm, so Ep-
stein would find for the plaintiff.
Another approach to problems cases, besides reasoning by para-
digms, is to attempt a definition of cause in terms of necessary and suffi-
cient conditions. There is a simple criterion, called the "but-for test,"
that lawyers often use to decide whether action A was the cause-in-fact
of event B. "But for A, would B have occurred?" If the answer to this
question is "No," then, according to this test, A is the cause-in-fact of B.
If the answer to this question is "Yes," then A is not the cause-in-fact of
B.
8. A careful description of what must be proved about causation to establish liability in tort is
provided by Keeton, Causation, 28 S. TEX. L.J. 189, 231 (1986).
9. Hart and Honor6 distinguished three types of causes: contingency, reason, and opportu-
nity. HART & HONORt, supra note 4, at 2. Epstein distinguished force (A hit B), fright (A fright-
ened B), compulsion (A compelled B to hit C), and dangerous condition (A created the dangerous
condition that resulted in harm to B). Epstein, supra note 4, at 160-89.
10. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 169-71.
LIBERTY AND EFFICIENCY
The but-for test, which is another way of asking whether one event
was a necessary condition for another,"I is adequate for determining
whether the defendant's tortious act was the cause-in-fact of the plain-
tiff's injury in most cases, but not in all cases. For example, the but-for
test gives the wrong answer when the effect was over-determined. To
illustrate, suppose a fire caused by the defendant's negligence reaches a
house and burns it down just before the site is reached by another fire
caused by lightning.' 2 The defendant's negligence was the cause-in-fact
of the fire that actually destroyed the plaintiff's house. The defendant's
negligence, however, was not a necessary condition for the building to
burn down; it would have burned down anyway because of the fire
caused by lightning. In this example, the defendant's negligence fails the
but-for test, even though it was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's loss.
This example illustrates something that philosophers have long rec-
ognized: causation is more complicated than a necessary condition. One
way to respond to the fact that cause-in-fact is more complicated than a
necessary condition is to try to define cause as a complex combination of
necessary and sufficient conditions. To illustrate a particularly clever
attempt along these lines, Mackie proposed that a cause is (get ready for
a mouthful) an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but suffi-
cient set of conditions for the effect. 13 In short, cause is an INUS condi-
tion. Let's consider each element in this definition separately. The event
constituting the cause is insufficient because it presupposes a background
set of conditions without which there will be no effect. Within those
background conditions, according to this definition, the cause is neces-
sary to produce the effect. Furthermore, the cause and the background
conditions, occurring together, are jointly sufficient for the effect. How-
ever, the effect may be produced in other ways, so this cause and these
background conditions are unnecessary for the effect to occur.
This attempt by Mackie to define causality through a combination
of logical operators is more convincing (and a lot more complicated)
than the but-for test. It is possible to contrive still more subtle and com-
plicated combinations of logical operators that are even more convinc-
I1. The argument by Fletcher, supra note 4, and Epstein, supra note 4, that cause is the root of
tort liability, comes close to the view that cause is a necessary and sufficient condition for tort
liability.
12. This hypothetical is an illustration from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(d), il-
lustration 4 (1965).
13. Mackie, Causes and Conditions, 2 AM. PHIL. Q. 245, 245-47 (1965). Wright pointed out to
me that this is based upon Hart and Honor 's NESS test. See HART & HONORIf, supra note 4, at
105-10.
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ing.14 There are apparently scholars who believe that some such analysis
will provide the best explanation of causation in torts.15 Instead of ex-
ploring the paradoxes and problems of these approaches,16 I will indicate
in a general way why I think the theory advanced in this paper is more
promising.
As case law evolves in torts, judges must draw the boundary be-
tween freedom and responsibility. Drawing the boundary involves ques-
tions about liberty and efficiency. For judges to debate these questions,
there must be language that is neutral in the sense that alternative con-
ceptions of liberty and efficiency can be described without bias. The de-
bate cannot be decided by the meaning of the basic terms in which it is
conducted. To be specific, an analysis of the meaning of "cause" in plain
speech, as applied to tort cases, cannot decide the issues facing judges.
Rather, an analysis of meaning accomplishes the more modest task of
increasing the clarity of expression by the different sides in the debate.
Plain speech theories should clarify issues of causation, not foreclose
them. Deciding issues of causation in tort law requires appeal to sub-
stantive values like liberty and efficiency.
B. Proximate Cause
Besides cause-in-fact, there is an additional causal requirement in
most tort suits that is illustrated by a familiar verse from Mother Goose:
For want of a nail, the shoe was lost;
For want of a shoe, the horse was lost;
For want of a horse, the rider was lost;
For want of a rider, the battle was lost;
For want of the battle, the kingdom was lost.
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.
This verse illlustrates that "but-for" causes can be ordered from the re-
mote to the proximate; furthermore, as but-for causes become more re-
mote, at some point attributing cause no longer makes sense. Indeed, the
conclusion that the downfall of the kingdom was caused by the want of a
horseshoe nail is absurd.
Explanations pick the cause from many background conditions.
14. An interesting approach is to define a logical operator called "cause" and develop the rules
by which it joins variables. This is a more rigorous, formal approach than concatenating necessity
and sufficiency. See G. VON WRIGHT, supra note 1.
15. See Wright I1, supra note 3, at 1788-1813.
16. See Michael Moore's discussion in this volume of tokens, types, and descriptions of cause in
the law. Moore, Thomson's Preliminaries About Causation and Rights, 63 CM-KENT L. REV. 497
(1987).
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The loss of a horseshoe nail is a reasonable explanation for why a horse
went lame. When the object of explanation expands from a horse going
lame to a rider being lost, to a battle being lost, and finally to the down-
fall of a kingdom, the context changes dramatically and new criteria
must be adopted for distinguishing between cause and background condi-
tions. The want of a horseshoe nail is a background condition, not the
cause, of the kingdom's downfall. To explain the downfall of the
kindgom, another type of fact must be chosen from the prevailing condi-
tions other than the want of a horseshoe nail.
In general, a relationship R between variables is transitive provided
that for any three variables a, b, and c:
aRb and bRc implies aRc.' 7
To illustrate, "a is larger than b" and "b is larger than c" implies that "a
is larger than c." Thus the relationship "larger than" is transitive. What
about causal relationships? If causal relationships were transitive, then
''a causes b' and "b causes c" would imply "a causes c." The Mother
Goose verse is a play on the fact that causal relations are imperfectly
transitive. The causal inference has force line by line in the verse, but it
decays as the chain that starts from the loss of the horseshoe nail grows
longer. The verse is amusing because the inference fails imperceptibly by
degrees. Causation can be called a "decaying transitive relation" because
extending the chain of inference weakens the relationship without de-
stroying it. 18
Tort law takes account of the decaying transitivity of cause by re-
quiring as a condition for recovering damages that cause be proximate
rather than remote. As the Mother Goose verse suggests, proximity is a
matter of degree. Courts do not seem to have a firm rule for deciding
how close the injurer's act must be to the accident to create liability.' 9
Prescribing such a rule would involve specifying the rate at which the
17. See, e.g., A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 2, 8 (1970).
18. I offer the following definition of decaying transitivity. Let p(aRb) denote the probability
that xRy for any relationship R and any variables a and b. Transitivity is decaying if aRb, bRc, and
cRd implies that p(aRc) > p(aRd) for any variables a, b, c, d.
19. Of course, lawyers have tried to extract a rule from the inchoate cases. Keeton tries to
summarize court practice as follows:
Legal causation can be delineated in three general propositions for proximate causation
where factual causation is presumably established. First, an actor's negligence is a proxi-
mate cause of harm to the plaintiff only if harm to one similarly situated to plaintiff was
reasonably foreseeable. Second, an actor's act or omission is a proximate cause of harm to
the plaintiff only if the harm arose out of a damaging event or accident of the same general
character as that which was reasonably foreseeable. Finally, an actor's conduct is a proxi-
mate cause of harm to the plaintiff only if the harm was not brought about by a new and
independent cause (a superseding cause).
Keeton, supra note 8, at 236.
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inference decays, which appears difficult or impossible. The proximity
requirement is apparently a matter of judgment that is enhanced by ex-
amining cases. 20
What elements are involved in reaching such a judgment? This
question sharply divides legal scholars. One view is that no new elements
are involved (or none should be involved) because "proximate cause" is
an aspect of "cause-in-fact." The terms do not designate distinct con-
cepts, according to this view, but instead they indicate two steps in apply-
ing a single concept. 2 1  The single concept is the idea of cause as
understood in ordinary discourse and sharpened by the history of its ap-
plication to cases in torts.
The sentence, "The defendant's act caused the plaintiff's injury,"
sounds like pure description of facts, whereas the sentence, "The defend-
ant is responsible for the plaintiff's injury," sounds like a judgment re-
quiring the application of norms. These propositions are often linked in
ordinary discourse, as in the statement, "The defendant caused the plain-
tiff's injury, so the defendant is responsible for it." There is a puzzle
here. On the one hand, cause appears to be a natural fact whereas re-
sponsibility appears to be a normative judgment, so there is a gap be-
tween them. On the other hand, in discourse we often pass directly from
describing causes to making judgments about responsibility as if there
were no gap.
A theory of tort liability must solve this puzzle by providing a sys-
tematic account of the relationship between causing harm and being re-
sponsible for it. One strand of legal thought, the "plain meaning"
approach already discussed, grounds the judgment in the fact. In this
tradition there is not much of a gap between describing the facts and
reaching a judgment about responsibility. 2 2 So the judgment of responsi-
bility is reached by carefully attending to the facts. This approach makes
20. Begin with Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), in which Judge
Cardozo enunciated the "reasonably foreseeable" test mentioned by Keeton. See supra note 19.
21. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 160.
22. Fletcher argues that the gap is smaller for his theory than for utilitarian or economic
alternatives:
The paradigm of reasonableness requires several stages of analysis: defining the risk, as-
sessing its consequences, balancing costs and benefits. The paradigm of reciprocity re-
quires a single conclusion, based on perceptions of similarities, of excessiveness, and of
directness. If an argument requires several steps, it basks in the respectability of precision
and rationality. Yet associating rationality with multistaged argumentation may be but a
spectacular lawyerly fallacy.
Fletcher, supra note 4, at 573.
But acts are susceptible to many descriptions and mere observation may not provide the basis
for adopting one description rather than another. The description relevant to an assignment of
liability is specified by tort law. Thus, Wright distinguishes between the defendant's act causing
harm and the defendant's tortious act causing harm. Wright II, supra note 3, at 1759-74.
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the determination of cause decisive for the assignment of liability. Cause
is in the driver's seat and liability is a passenger.
The opposite view is that proximate cause introduces entirely new
elements into the inquiry, the new elements being normative considera-
tions, such as policy values and goals. 23 There is, according to this view,
a large gap between describing material causes and reaching a judgment
about responsibility, which is filled by these normative elements. The
legal realists take this view to its extreme by concluding that proximate
cause is the guise in which courts smuggle policy judgments into the case
in order to decide it on grounds that are unrelated to causation. 24 In-
stead of description grounding the judgment, according to this view, the
judgment of responsibility grounds the description of legal cause. The
judgment of responsibility is in the driver's seat, and cause is a passenger.
As explained in the next section, the efficiency theorists are, in this re-
spect, much like the realists, since they take the view that ascribing prox-
imate cause is, or should be, a policy judgment.
II. CAUSE IN THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW
Legal cause will be related to cause in formal models by a brief re-
view of the history of the economic analysis of torts. A major source of
contemporary economic analysis of law is Coase's seminal article, The
Problem of Social Cost, published in 1960.25 This article attacks the cau-
sation requirement for recovery in tort. Since Coase's article, the eco-
nomic analysis of law has flourished and matured. Contemporary
theories draw upon formal models that use more rigorous analytical
techniques than Coase used, but, as I will show, the disparagement of
legal cause persists as an inherent feature in the logic of these models.
A. Coase's Repudiation of Cause-In-Fact
In his classic article, Coase attempted to debunk the idea that cause,
in its plain meaning, should influence the assignment of liability in tort
law. He observed that forbidding one person from interfering with an-
other is itself a form of interference by the state. From this observation
he concluded that it is not intrinsically better for law to prevent one per-
son from interfering with another than to leave them alone. Coase devel-
oped this stance in detail under the implicit assumption that economic
23. See Wright's discussion of causation and the legal realists. Wright II, supra note 3, at 1737-
39. See also Calabresi, supra note 2.
24. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 42, at 244, 249-50 (4th ed. 1971).
25. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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efficiency is the law's purpose. The fact that one person interferes with
another indicates nothing, according to Coase, about whether a liability
rule would be more or less efficient than a rule of no liability.
To illustrate, in some regions of America there is open range (farm-
ers must protect their crops against straying cattle) and in other regions
the range is closed (ranchers must prevent their cattle from straying and
destroying the farmers' crops). The question of open versus closed range
is, for Coase, a question of cheaper beef or cheaper crops. The law
should open or close the range depending upon which alternative yields
larger net economic benefits. Popular intuitions about whether farmers
or ranchers cause the harm done by straying cattle cannot decide
whether opening or closing the range is more efficient. In general, such
liability issues should be decided, according to Coase, by a cost-benefit
analysis.
B. Cause in Formal Models
By such arguments Coase sought to debunk the role of cause in de-
ciding tort liability. Subsequent work on the economic analysis of torts
has preserved the essentials of Coase's theory, while making some con-
cessions to the language of causation. In his pioneering book The Cost of
Accidents, Calabresi identified the following variables as elements in the
simplest, most fundamental economic model of accidents: the
probability of an accident, the dollar value of the harm caused by an
accident, and the expenditures on precaution taken against accidents.2 6
The accident's probability multiplied by the resulting harm equals, by
definition, the expected harm. Calabresi proposed that an important goal
of tort law is to minimize the sum of the cost of precaution and the ex-
pected harm from accidents.
In the simplest situation imagined by Calabresi, there may be several
people who can prevent the accident, but not at the same cost. The party
who can prevent the accident at less cost than anyone else is the cheapest
cost avoider. According to Calabresi's theory, the court should assign
liability for the accident to the cheapest cost avoider, at least insofar as
26. Calabresi states, "[t]he second and perhaps more important way general deterrence reduces
accident costs is that it encourages us to make activities safer." G. CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 73.
He also discusses this framework in Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YAILE L.J. 656
(1975). 1 use the term "precaution" to encompass all the ways of making an activity safer. The
reader should realize that Calabresi also discusses a much wider framework of social costs ("Secon-
dary Accident Costs") in THE COST OF ACCIDENTS. The goal of minimizing the sum of accident
costs and the cost of accident avoidance was also analyzed by Posner in Posner, A Theory of Negli-
gence, I J. LEGAl. STUD. 29 (1972).
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the goal of tort law is economic efficiency. 27 But-for causation provides a
guide to making this determination, although the final determination
must be made on different grounds. The final determination, according
to Calabresi, is often reached by the court through its inquiry into proxi-
mate cause. 28 Like the legal realists, Calabresi views proximate cause as
a guise for policy judgments. He believes the court should identify the
cheapest cost avoider and then describe him as the cause of the accident.
This is a tautology (or perhaps a tortology), but Calabresi expects the
language of cause to survive rather than to be replaced by direct appeal
to the goals controlling its use. 29
The efficiency of various tort rules was first tested against Cala-
bresi's standard of cost minimization in a formal model by John
Brown. 30 The basic structure of Brown's model is worth repeating for
those unfamiliar with it because his paper established the mathematical
mode that has become the norm in the economic analysis of tort law.
Expenditure on precaution, denoted x, reduces the probability of acci-
dents, denoted p, as indicated by the function p=p(x). 3  The probability
of an accident p times the loss from the accident, denoted A, equals the
expected loss. Thus, the expected loss from accidents is a (decreasing)
function of precaution, or expected loss = p(x)A. The full cost of acci-
dents in the most basic economic model equals the sum of the cost of
precaution x and the expected harm:
x + p(x)A.
Efficiency requires setting expenditures on precaution x at a level that
minimizes this sum.
27. Calabresi writes, "[i]f market deterrence were the only goal of tort law, then all causation
problems would be reduced to a search for the cheapest cost avoider. Tort law, however, is a system
that responds to mixed goals." Calabresi, supra note 2, at 100.
28. For example, Calabresi states:
General or market deterrence, then, relies on causal linkage as one crucial element in iden-
tifying the optimal loss bearer. It relies on but for cause as a sound way of determining, on
a case-by-case basis, what burden-incentive should be placed on the loss bearer. Yet
neither concept, together or separately, suffices to identify the proper loss bearer. The
requirement of proximate cause is necessary to select[,] from actors who may be cheapest
cost avoiders because they are sufficiently linked, those who in fact are.
Id. at 87 (emphasis in original).
29. Calabresi reasons:
I am inclined to believe that the requirement of causation in all three of its parts (causal
link, but for and proximity) will survive in many areas of non-fault liability rather than be
replaced by direct appeals to those clearly identified goals which, by and large, those re-
quirements seem to serve.
Id. at 108 (emphasis in original).
30. Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAl. STUD. 323 (1973).
31. Brown's formulation distinguished injurer's precaution from victim's precaution: he also




The variable x is not, however, chosen directly by the court.
Rather, the court establishes liability rules that create incentives for pri-
vate parties to set x at particular levels. In his study, Brown obtained
explicit mathematical expressions for the incentives of various liability
rules, such as strict liability and negligence, and then tested them to see
whether rational decision makers would respond to these incentives by
choosing x to minimize the cost of accidents. In technical language, he
investigated whether the equilibrium levels of precaution under various
liability rules equal the efficient levels of care.
Brown did not explicitly concern himself with the problem of cause.
Perhaps he thought, like Calabresi, that cause is merely a conclusion put
on the case. Brown's model, however, implicitly used a concept of cause
that is prominent in subsequent articles by economists. As explained,
Brown assumed a functional relationship between precaution x and the
probability of an accident p. The connection between precaution and the
occurrence of an accident is probabilistic in Brown's model. Since the
relationship is probabilistic, a particular level of precaution is unneces-
sary for the occurrence of an accident. Recall that the but-for test asks
whether a particular act is necessary for a specific effect. In general,
probabilistic relations do not describe necessary conditions. So the im-
plicit concept of cause in Brown's model must be different from cause-in-
fact as explained by the but-for test. To illustrate, suppose that a reckless
driver crashes into the rear of another automobile. In Brown's model,
recklessness increases the probability of an accident. It does not follow,
however, that the accident would have been avoided but for the
recklessness.
Noting this fact, economic analysts distinguished probabilistic cause
from but-for cause, 32 and built models based upon the former. An exam-
ple of explicit, detailed consideration of probabilistic cause is provided by
Shavell's recent article, 33 which extends the analyses of Brown and Cala-
bresi, as I will illustrate by adapting one of Shavell's examples. 34 The
probability that a bicyclist riding in the park will strike a pedestrian de-
pends in part upon whether the bicycle is equipped with a light. This
relationship is an application of Brown's general function p=p(x), in
which x denotes the brightness of the bicycle's light and p denotes the
32. Calabresi discussed three types of cause: probabilistic, but-for, and proximate. Calabresi,
supra note 2, at 71-73. Shavell contrasts retrospective cause and prospective cause, where the former
is identified with but-for cause and the latter is identified with probabilistic cause. Shavell, supra
note 2, at 466-70.
33. See Shavell, supra note 2.
34. Shavell's third example involves a bicyclist, a jogger and visibility. Id. at 472, 477.
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probability of striking a pedestrian. Another determinant of the
probability of such an accident, besides being equipped with a light, is the
weather. Thus an accident is more likely on a foggy night than on a clear
night. Unlike Brown, Shavell did not limit his analysis to relations be-
tween the probability of accidents and precautions against them, but ex-
plicitly considered the effects of conditions beyond human control such
as the presence of fog. This broadening of the inquiry can be expressed
formally by allowing the variable z to represent natural visibility, which
is impaired by fog, and rewriting the probability function as p=p(x,z).
In a tort suit the court must decide whether the defendant's behav-
ior fell within the scope of liability as specified by the law. The scope of
liability refers to the conditions under which a defendant will be held
responsible for the plaintiff's loss. Suppose an economic model leads to
the conclusion that bicycles should not be ridden without a light of
power x* when visibility falls below some level z*. Under these assump-
tions, an efficient tort rule might take the form that the bicyclist is liable
for accidents when riding without an adequate light (x < x*) under con-
ditions of poor visibility (z < z*). Thus the boundries on the scope of
liability are defined mathematically by x* and z*.
Increasing the scope of liability has three main effects identified by
Shavell: 35 1) the burden on injurers is increased, thereby discouraging
people from engaging in the dangerous activity; 2) the administrative
cost of deciding more court cases probably increases; and 3) injurers have
greater incentives to take precautions when engaging in the dangerous
activity. To illustrate, expanding the scope of liability for bicyclists
would probably cause fewer people to ride; broader liability would proba-
bly result in more trials; and those who ride would take more precaution.
The scope of liability is optimal from the viewpoint of economic effi-
ciency when the losses and gains from a small increase in it cancel each
other. To be exact, the scope of liability is optimal when a small increase
causes a gain in the form of fewer accidents, the value of which is exactly
offset by a loss in the form of a lower activity level and higher costs of
precaution and litigation. 36
35. Shavell first discusses the effects of modifying the scope of liability under a rule of strict
liability; then he discusses the effects under negligence. But he concludes that the effects are much
the same, stating, "[h]owever, once one recognizes that under the negligence rule there is an impor-
tant element of strict liability ... all the results concerning the scope of liability under strict liability
become relevant under the negligence rule." Id. at 489. This conclusion is too glib, because a negli-
gence rule induces a discontinuity in cost at the legal standard of care that spoils marginalist reason-
ing. See Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1539 (1984).
36. Shavell reasons that, "[fqor a type of accident to be included in the scope of liability, it
should have the fundamental characteristic that, given the circumstances under which it occurs,
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It is against this efficiency standard that Shavell evaluated the legal
rules of causation in torts, praising or blaming each rule depending upon
whether each correctly balances costs. Shavell concludes from applying
his model to case law that there is a close, but imperfect correspondence
between the scope of liability in tort law and the scope of liability re-
quired to achieve economic efficiency. 37  If there is a close fit between
legal cause and economic efficiency, the court will say that a defendant
caused the accident when his behavior was inefficient, but not otherwise.
C. Problem Cases Involving Cause38
Much of the dispute about cause in tort law concerns a set of prob-
lem cases where the question of causality is perplexing. In these cases
simple inferences from observation leave courts in a muddle, so they
must be more explicit about causation than in routine cases. When intui-
tive thinking becomes confused, a formal model is illuminating, provided
that it fits the facts. When economic models are applied to problem cases
in tort law, the results are often useful and illuminating. A brief applica-
tion of the efficiency models to problem cases illustrates the economic
style of analysis, even though a full application is beyond this article's
scope.
Let us begin with some questions raised by causal over-determina-
tion. I already mentioned the example of two fires, one started by negli-
gence and the other by lightning, burning towards the same house. If the
fire set by negligence reaches the house first and destroys it, can the
owner recover even though the house would have been destroyed any-
way? The efficiency analysis provides a simple answer in such cases of
over-determination: The law should not create incentives to waste re-
sources attempting to avoid the inevitable. Thus, if two fires are burning
there must be a sufficiently high potential for reducing losses by taking more care.- Shavell, supra
note 2, at 484.
37. For example, Shavell states:
Thus if the instrumentalist approach yields a successful explanatory theory, it must be that
the intuitions about what is just comport with the application of a cost-benefit calculus in
relation to the posited social goals.
Yet, it also seems undeniable that the conceptions of when it is just to include a type of
accident in the scope of liability have some life of their own, independent of any clear
connection with postulated social goals through provision of incentives (or spreading of
risks). Now there is no reason why, as a purely formal matter, the conceptions could not
themselves be included among the social goals. However, their inclusion would detract
from the analysis. More insight can be had by elaborating a parsimonious theory and by
qualifying it at the end than by building into it all manner of assumption.
Id. at 502-03.
38. This section relies heavily on material presented by Steve Sugarman to a torts seminar at
the Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
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towards a house and either fire is sufficient to destroy it, and no other
property is in danger, spending resources to put out just one of them is
wasteful. Insofar as allowing recovery would create incentives for waste-
ful precautions, a court applying efficiency analysis should not allow the
plaintiff to recover in such cases of causal over-determination.
Another example is where a patient does not give informed consent
to an operation because the surgeon fails to provide the patient with the
necessary facts. If the operation goes awry, can the patient recover from
the surgeon even though the patient would have consented if informed? 39
The economic analysis of law provides a definite answer: If there really
were no doubt that a patient would consent to surgery, expending re-
sources to obtain it would be wasteful, so liability should not attach to
the surgeon. In practice, however, we may be uncertain that someone
would consent short of actually obtaining it, in which case the surgeon
can be held liable in order to provide incentives to obtain actual consent.
Another problem case involves superseding negligence. To illus-
trate, suppose a wholesaler accidentally delivers gasoline to a retail store
in containers marked "kerosene." The wholesaler discovers the error and
phones the retailer to arrange an exchange, but before the wholesaler can
get to the store to pick up the containers, the retailer accidentally sells
one to a customer who is subsequently injured. In this example, the
wholesaler's negligence was superseded by the retailer's negligence.
When the customer is injured, should liability rest with the wholesaler or
the retailer? 4°
More than one person often has access to precautions that reduce
the probability of the accident. When efficiency requires precaution by
more than one person, the precaution is said to be bilateral, as opposed to
unilateral. In cases of bilateral precaution, the fundamental economic
problem for law is to create efficient incentives for several people at once.
The solution is similar for all types of bilateral precaution. 4' Bilateral
precaution in economic models usually takes the form of precaution by
defendant and plaintiff, but in the preceding example, the plaintiff is not
one of the parties who can prevent the harm. Rather, the retailer and the
wholesaler can prevent it. This, however, is merely a detail in an effi-
39. A case involving similar facts is Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr.
505 (1972).
40. This hypothetical is based on Catlin v. Union Oil Co., 31 Cal. App. 597, 161 P. 29 (1916).
Superseding causes are discussed in Keeton, supra note 8.
41. A standard conclusion in the economic analysis of law is that the efficiency problem raised
by bilateral precaution can be solved in principle through some form of a negligence rule, as opposed
to a rule of strict liability. The general problem is analyzed in Cooter, Unity in Tort. Contract. and
Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 ClIIw. L. Ruv. 1 (1985).
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ciency analysis. It makes little difference formally whether or not the
victim is one of the parties who should take precaution.
Superseding negligence does not raise a special problem of efficient
incentives that is different from other cases of bilateral precaution.
Under any form of a negligence rule, the parties who can escape liability
by behaving nonnegligently will minimize their own costs by conforming
to the legal standard of care, provided that it does not deviate too far
from the efficient standard of care.42 In cases involving superseding neg-
ligence, both parties will normally have adequate incentives to take care,
regardless of how the law allocates liability between them. To choose
between alternative allocations of liability, an efficiency analysis must
take account of considerations other than precaution, such as incentives
for suits and activity levels. A fine analysis of these considerations in
cases of superseding negligence is, however, beyond this article's scope.
Another type of problem case involves the "wrong hazard." To il-
lustrate, a stevedore drops a plank into the hold of a ship and it causes a
fire. Dropping a plank into a ship's hold might ordinarily cause a head
injury, but not a fire. Should the stevedore or his employer be liable for
the damage done by the fire?43 Another hypothetical example of the
wrong hazard is when someone hands a loaded pistol to a child and he
drops it on his foot. Is the person who handed the pistol to the child
liable for the broken foot?44
Shavell's analysis suggests the following approach to such cases:
when the scope of liability is increased, potential defendants have
stronger incentives to take precaution, and potential plaintiffs have
stronger incentives to bring costly suits. The scope of liability should not
be expanded unless the net benefit from increased precaution by defend-
ants more than outweighs the increase in the cost of additional suits. In
cases of the "wrong hazard" the injurer will not foresee a connection
between his act and the accident. Since the injurer makes no connection,
bringing these events within the scope of liability will not affect the in-
jurer's precaution or the frequency of accidents. So giving plaintiffs a
cause of action in cases of the wrong hazard is probably inefficient. 45
42. This familiar result in the economic analysis of torts was first suggested by Brown when he
proved that several forms of the negligence rule are efficient provided that the standard of care is
determined by the Hand Rule. An explanation of the general result and a brief history of its assimi-
lation into the torts literature is found in Cooter & Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative Negli-
gence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067, 1081-83, 1084-86 (1986).
43. See In re An Arbitration Between Polemis and Another and Furness, 3 K.B. 560, 21 All
E.R. 40 (1921).
44. This hypothetical appears in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 comment f, illus-
tration 3 (1965).
45. See Shavell, supra note 2, at 490. This argument needs to be developed with greater preci-
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Another type of problem case involves causal uncertainty. To illus-
trate, suppose the defendant pollutes drinking water with a carcinogen
and ten percent more people get cancer than was otherwise expected.
Further proof connecting the pollution to the illness of particular persons
is impossible. Can some or all of the cancer victims recover?46 Or sup-
pose a person falls overboard on a ferry and drowns. The ferry should
have had a lifesaving ring but it did not. A lifesaving ring would have
been effective in twenty percent of such cases. Can the heirs of the victim
recover from the owner of the ferry? 47
In economic models, efficiency requires the injurer to balance the
cost of additional precaution against the reduction in expected harm.
The injurer already bears the cost of her own precaution. The incentive
problem is to make her internalize the expected harm. In the example of
polluted water, the expected harm equals the incidence of cancer caused
by the pollution multiplied by the cost the disease imposes upon its vic-
tims. Let p indicate the increased probability of cancer caused by the
pollution and let A be the harm suffered by a cancer victim. The ex-
pected harm, then, is pA.
If the injurer is liable for pA, the money collected can be treated as a
pool of funds to be allocated among victims according to some distribu-
tional rule. The polluters will face incentives for efficient precaution so
long as they are liable for the expected harm they cause, regardless of
how this pool of funds is parceled out among the victims. The rule ordi-
narily followed is to award damages of A to accident victims whose harm
was caused by the defendant. By hypothesis, there is no way to make
this causal determination. In the polluted water case, the court could
divide the pool of damages equally among everyone contracting cancer,
in which case each victim would get less than A. Alternatively, the court
could award damages of pA to everyone exposed to the risk of getting
cancer, including the people who did not contract it. Either approach
will provide incentives for efficient precaution by the injurer, because in
both approaches the injurer's liability equals the expected harm pA. A
similar analysis applies to the example of the missing lifesaving ring.
I have discussed several different types of problem cases-over-de-
termination, intervening cause, wrong hazard, and causal uncertainty.
sion and detail. Shavell's assumption that small risks are underestimated is inconsistent with the
rational expectations theories that predominate in economics.
46. A related case on water contamination is Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 226 N.Y. 516, 124
N.E. 137 (1919).
47. This hypothetical is inspired by examples illustrated in M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN. CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 275 (3rd ed. 1983).
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My discussion is intended to show that the economic analysis provides
some leverage for moving these stubborn cases, even though the difficul-
ties they raise are too profound to solve in a couple of paragraphs.
D. Reduction of Cause to Efficiency
Judging by the work of Coase, Calabresi, Brown, and Shavell, the
efficiency analysis of tort rules proceeds in three steps. 48 The first step is
formulating a functional relationship between the probability of an acci-
dent, the injurer's precaution, and certain background conditions like
visibility in the bicycle example. The second stage is finding the optimal
scope of the liability rule from the viewpoint of economic efficiency. The
causation requirement is an aspect of the scope of efficient liability rules.
In this tradition, if efficiency requires holding the defendant liable, he is
said to have caused the accident, but not otherwise. Thus the ascription
of cause in the third step announces a judgment about efficiency.
"Cause" is reduced to "efficiency" in the sense that the ascription of legal
cause is wholly dependent upon the judgment about economic efficiency.
Landes and Posner are more explicit than others about this policy
judgment. They say in bald terms that the party who should be held
liable for an accident under an efficiency standard will be deemed to have
caused it.49 It makes no sense, in their view, to say that the defendant
caused the accident and he should not be held liable for it. Saying the
defendant caused the accident means, in their view, that efficiency re-
quires holding him liable. Insofar as efficiency is the only criterion for
applying the word "cause," the legal meaning of this word is exhausted
by the efficiency analysis. If "cause" has no legal meaning beyond effi-
ciency, it can be eliminated from discourse without loss, at least among
economically literate scholars. 50
48. I have not discussed in this article the conclusions of economic analysts concerning which
rules are efficient. For a summary, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 6, at chs. 8, 9.
49. Landes and Posner state:
One strain in the modern philosophical literature on causation regards the cause of an
occurrence as whatever antecedent condition, necessary or sufficient, is most significant in
relation to the reasons for which causal ascription is being made .... If the basic purpose
of tort law is to promote economic efficiency, a defendant's conduct will be deemed the
cause of an injury when making him liable for the consequences of the injury would pro-
mote an efficient allocation of resources to safety and care; and when it would not promote
efficiency for the defendant to behave differently, then the cause of the accident will be
ascribed to "an act of God" or some other force on which liability cannot rest. In this
view, the injurer "causes" the injury when he is the cheaper cost avoider; not otherwise.
The idea of causation becomes a result rather than a premise of the economic analysis of
accidents.
Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 110.
50. Landes and Posner state:
From here it is but a short step to the conclusion that the idea of causation can very largely
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The logic of the efficiency analysis of tort law seems to require re-
ducing cause to efficiency, much as Russell noted that "cause" is re-
placed in science by more exact functional relationships. To evaluate this
claim, it is necessary to be more explicit about what is being reduced to
what in economic models. The relationship between defendant's precau-
tion x and the probability p that the plaintiff suffers an accident is said to
be an "externality." This term has several different meanings in econom-
ics, two of which will be distinguished.5'
The first type, which I call a "material externality, ' 52 exists when
there is an interdependency in utility or production functions. To illus-
trate, if my smoking affects the quality of the air that you breathe, both
of us will have preferences concerning how much I smoke. This is a
situation in which one variable, representing the extent to which I smoke,
enters two utility functions, yours and mine. Similarly, when the func-
tion p = p(x,z) is interpreted to mean that, given the environmental con-
ditions z, the probability p that one person suffers harm depends upon
the precaution x taken by another person, the variable x enters into two
utility functions, which makes them interdependent.
In functional relationships like p=p(x,z), the values of the in-
dependent variables determine the value of the dependent variable. The
determination of one variable by others is said to be causal, not merely a
correlation. The function describing a material externality thus indicates
a causal relationship between one person's behavior and another's utility
or profit. The independent variables in a function characterizing a mate-
rial externality can be called material causes of the value of the depen-
dent variable. To illustrate, "probabilistic cause" refers to a particular
type of material cause in which the functional relationship is probabilis-
tic. Thus the bicyclist's precaution x and visibility z cause the probability
p of an accident to take the value given by the function p=p(x,z).
be dispensed with in an economic analysis of torts, in much the same way that the idea of
intentionality can very largely be dispensed with in the economic analysis of intentional
torts. This is not to say that lawyers and judges could or should dispense with terms such
as intent and causation. They do not have an economic vocabularly in which to express the
ideas conveyed by such terms. But the economic analysis of tort law does not need to use
these terms.
Id. at 110-11.
51. Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay, 9 J. ECON. LIT. 1
(1971).
52. Let x' be a vector describing person i's consumption. Let xi be a vector describing person j's
consumption. A material externality exists if i's utility is affected by j's consumption, in which case
i's utility function has the form u'(x',x). This is a consumer-on-consumer material externality. To
illustrate a producer-on-consumer material externality, just repeat the preceding definition but inter-
pret xi as the output of the jth firm. Note that this definition makes externalities a characteristic of
taste and technology.
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Notice that the efficiency analysis presupposes that causal attribu-
tion in torts cases draws upon underlying generalizations, like p = p(x,z),
that apply to all similar situations, past or future.5 3 Many courtroom
explanations of accidents, however, refer to particular events that imme-
diately preceded the accident, without explicit reference to generaliza-
tions. The connection between the cause and its effect is stated as an
observable fact, without reference to a generalization. If generalizations
play any role in these statements, they are merely common-sense pro-
positions that form part of everyone's understanding of the world, such
as "A person struck by a moving car will be injured" or "Bicycle lights
improve the rider's visibility in a fog." These generalizations are so com-
monplace that cause is said to be observed, not deduced.
The "plain fact" approach to legal cause, discussed earlier, may
deny that generalizations like p=p(x,z) have a role in causal attribution
in the courtroom, whereas such generalizations necessarily have a role in
reaching an efficiency judgment. 54
53. A causal explanation that draws upon a generalization like p=p(x,z) has been called "pro-
spective" since it applies to all similar situations in the future. The prospective cause of a particular
event is identified by bringing it under a generalization as an instance of it. See Shavell, supra note 2.
54. This disagreement resembles an earlier debate among philosophers touched off by Hempel's
claim that general truths must be invoked, implicitly or explicitly, when explaining a particular
event. These general truths, according to Hempel, are the "covering laws" that serve as premises in
deducing the event being explained. Every full explanation of a particular event, according to
Hempel, contains a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. The major premise is a
generalization concerning a regularity found in the world; the minor premise asserts that the general-
ization applies to the case at hand; the conclusion is that one event caused the other. To illustrate
from economics:
Major premise: Inflation causes devaluation.
Minor premise: Inflation preceded the devaluation of 1967.
Conclusion: Inflation caused the devaluation of 1967.
The explanation proceeds by bringing a particular event described in the minor premise under a
general law stated in the major premise. The general law is called the "covering law" because it
covers the facts at issue. See C. HEMPEL, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, in ASPECTS OF SCIEN-
TIFIC EXPLANATION AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 331, 415-24 (1965);
Hempel, Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation, in 3 MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 98 (H. Feigl & G. Maxwell ed. 1962); Hempel, The Logic of Functional Analy-
sis, in SYMPOSIUM ON SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 271 (L. Gross ed. 1959); Hempel & Oppenheim, The
Logic of Explanation, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 319 (H. Feigl & M. Brodbeck
ed. 1953).
For a defense of Hempel's model as applied to historical explanation, see Donagan, Explanation
in History, in THEORIES OF HISTORY 428 (P. Gardiner ed. 1959). For a review of Hempel's critics,
see Brodbeck, Explanation, Prediction, and "Imperfect" Knowledge, in 3 MINNESOTA STUDIES IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 231 (H. Feigl & G. Maxwell ed. 1962).
Anyone familiar with economics can think of numerous examples of explanations that have this
form. Hempel has apparently characterized a common form of scientific explanation, but Hempel
originally asserted that all explanations, even historical, have this form. Hempel moderated his
original claim that the "deductive-nomological model" is the only form of a full explanation in light
of his critics, but he never conceded much. This is not credible as an account of most historical
explantions, as philosophers have pointed out. An especially compelling criticism of such views is
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Having discussed material interdependencies, I move on to the sec-
ond type of externality in models of tort law, which I call an "incentive
externality." An incentive externality exists when some of the costs or
benefits of a decision escape the decision maker and fall upon others.
This type of externality creates an incentive problem because a self-inter-
ested person will not take account of the full costs and benefits of his
decisions. To illustrate, under a rule of no liability, an injurer who fails
to take precaution imposes risks upon others. Unless victims can bribe
the injurer into taking precaution, doing so is not in the latter's self-inter-
est. In contrast, when costs and benefits are fully internalized, the deci-
sion maker sweeps all relevant benefits and costs into his decision
calculus.
Material externalities often create incentive externalities. To illus-
trate, when factory smoke harms consumers there is a material external-
ity, and when a factory is not liable for the harm caused by the smoke it
emits, there is an incentive externality. 55 This is a problem for public
policy. Government must act to prevent excessive smoke. What is the
best response? The material externality, being a characteristic of taste
and technology, cannot be eliminated except by discovering a clean tech-
nology. A change in law, however, can correct the incentive externality.
If the factory is fully liable for the harm caused by its emissions, it will
internalize the full cost of polluting and there will be no incentive exter-
nality on the part of the factory. 56 Structuring the law to eliminate in-
centive externalities is the best public policy response to material
externalities.
Economic theory builds upon simple elements that are relatively sta-
ble, specifically taste and technology. Material linkages like p=p(x,z)
are used in economic models to discover efficient liability rules. Having
described the material linkages by functions and having derived the effi-
cient liability rule, the model builder can proceed to the next step of as-
signing legal cause. A defendant whose behavior falls within the scope of
liability of an efficient rule is said to have caused the harm. I describe the
behavior that gives rise to liability under an efficient tort rule as the
"legal cause of the harm under an efficiency norm."
To contrast material cause and legal cause under an efficiency norm,
found in G. VON WRIGHT, EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING (1971). There are many others.
See, e.g., Brodbeck, supra.
55. This argument assumes no bargaining between polluter and pollutee, as demonstrated ele-
gantly by Coase. See Coase, supra note 25.
56. Correcting the incentive externality for the factory will create an incentive externality for
households in some circumstances. Such problems of bilateral precaution cannot generally be
solved by a rule of strict liability.
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return to the example of the bicyclist and the pedestrian. Suppose that
visibility is good enough so that efficiency does not require a cyclist to
have a light, yet having a light would still reduce the probability of strik-
ing a pedestrian. Under these conditions, the absence of a light could be
a material cause of the higher risk of an accident. An efficiency analysis,
however, would conclude that riding without a light under these circum-
stances should not be deemed the legal cause of a collision between a
cyclist and a pedestrian. So riding without a light may be the material
cause of an accident without being the legal cause under an efficiency
norm. On the other hand, if circumstances change and an accident oc-
curs when the cyclist is riding without a light under conditions in which
an efficient rule requires him to have one, the absence of a light is both
the material cause and the legal cause of the accident under an efficiency
norm.
It is now possible to provide a clear statement of the relationship
between causation and efficiency in economic models of tort law. The
efficiency models begin with functional relations like p=p(x,z) that de-
scribe generalizations about material externalities. Tort law is viewed as
an instrument for eliminating the incentive externalities created by the
material externalities described in these functions. Thus the efficiency
models conclude that the defendant caused the accident and is liable to
the plaintiff provided that defendant's behavior is a material cause of ex-
ternal harm to the plaintiff and a rule of defendant's liability provides
incentives for efficient behavior by the parties.
III. EFFICIENCY AND LIBERTY
The efficiency models discussed in the preceding section are both
valuable in understanding tort law and seriously incomplete. They are
incomplete because basic tort rights should be understood as part of the
initial distribution of resources that is the starting point for any economic
analysis. This section of the article sketches some formal attributes of a
theory of liberty that provides an account of the initial distribution of
resources, explains why the efficiency analysis requires such a theory, and
concludes with an account of tort law as the union of liberty and
efficiency.
A. A Theory of Liberty
Liberty requires a protected zone around each person within which
discretion can be exercised without interference from others. In drawing
the boundaries of the protected zone, the law must balance the freedom
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of each person to act and the responsibility of each person not to harm
others. Two specific considerations relevant to tort law must be weighed.
First, an individual who causes harm to another should compensate the
victim. Without this obligation tort law would fail to protect individuals
from continual interference by others. Second, some consequences must
be judged too remote to give rise to liability. Without this restriction
every act would give rise to liability for some harm distantly connected to
it.
The obligation of a person who harms another to pay compensation
is closely connected to cause-in-fact. The restriction that some effects are
too remote to give rise to liability is closely connected to proximate
cause. So the two fundamental concepts of causality in torts-cause-in-
fact and proximity-are the instruments for balancing freedom and re-
sponsibility when prescribing a legal conception of liberty. 57
A limitation of the efficiency analysis is that it cannot provide ade-
quate explanation or justification for some basic tort rights, such as bod-
ily integrity. No one is permitted to intentionally harm another's body
without obtaining his or her consent (and maybe not even then). In this
sense, everyone owns his or her own body. Efficiency arguments can be
constructed to justify this fact, such as the following. Suppose we both
have sound bodies, but you own my body and I own yours. I value the
ownership of my body more than yours, and you value the ownership of
your body more than mine. So we would both be better off to swap. The
common law saves the cost of the transaction by allocating to each of us
the ownership of our own bodies in the first place. The common law can
thus be construed as assigning ownership over our own bodies for the
sake of efficiency.
This argument is more clever than convincing. Does anyone really
think that a person owns his or her own body because that is more effi-
cient? If it turned out that enslaving some people would increase na-
tional wealth, would the law embrace slavery? If a rich person would be
willing to pay more to injure a poor person than the poor person would
pay to escape injury, would the law permit the rich person to injure the
poor person? If a crippled person would prefer to own someone else's
body rather than his own, should the law take this fact into account
57. The view that causation in tort and liberty are intimately linked is argued by Epstein, supra
note 4. This view is compatible with many different substantive theories of liberty. To illustrate,
Epstein argues that the absence of a duty to rescue in the common law tradition follows from a
theory of liberty; however, a theory of liberty closer to the one developed by John Rawls might lead
to very different conclusions about this specific duty. See generally J. RAWi.S, A THEORY OF JUS-
TICE (1971).
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when assigning rights to bodies? The efficiency explanation is unconvinc-
ing because it makes ownership of our own bodies contingent on particu-
lar facts that must be true in order for efficiency to require each of us to
own our own bodies. The preceding questions, however, show that most
of us would persist in thinking that people should own their own bodies
even if these facts were altered. A convincing justification must make the
ownership of our own bodies more certain and fixed than in the efficiency
analysis.
This criticism places limits on Coase's attempt to debunk causation
in torts. Recall that Coase can be interpreted as arguing that one person
should not be prohibited from interfering with another unless efficiency
requires the prohibition. This argument makes some sense with respect
to cows and crops, but not with respect to bodies. Prohibiting one person
from physically harming another should not depend upon a cost-benefit
analysis reaching the conclusion that such a prohibition is efficient. Sup-
pose a cost benefit analysis reached the opposite conclusion. Few judges
would be convinced that inflicting physical harm should be allowed just
because the injurer is willing to pay more for the right to harm another
than the victim is willing to pay to be free from harm.
A similar argument can be applied to the distribution of physical
property. To illustrate, consider a sketch of Aristotle's conception of the
relationship between distributive justice and corrective justice.58 Accord-
ing to Aristotle, each type of society has its own principle of wealth dis-
tribution. Thus, a democratic society favors an equal distribution; in
contrast, an aristocratic society favors the principle that the best should
have more. Once a society's conception of the just distribution is
achieved, a person who disrupts it does an injustice that must be cor-
rected, according to this theory, by paying compensation. To be specific,
a person who causes a tortious accident must compensate the victim in
order to restore a just distribution of wealth.
This conception of corrective justice can come into conflict with
cost-benefit analysis as applied to tort liability. To illustrate, suppose
that I burn off the chaff from the harvested wheat fields at Whiteacre in a
way that endangers the neighboring estate of Blackacre. If I value the
right to burn my fields more than my neighbor values the right to be free
from the associated risk, economic efficiency demands that I continue to
burn. This result can be achieved at the least cost if I am given that
58. Here I rely primarily upon Jim Gordley's account of Aristotle's distinction between distrib-
utive and commutative justice. See Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1587 (1981).
Aristotle's theory of corrective justice is also discussed briefly as applied to torts by Jules Coleman.
See Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 IJ. LEGAL STUD. 421 (1982).
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right. If, in contrast, the courts give Blackacre's owners the right to be
free from danger, I will have to buy it from them, which involves an
additional transaction. In general, law achieves the efficient allocation of
entitlements at the lowest transaction costs by allocating them directly to
the parties willing to pay the most for them.
This efficiency principle makes ownership contingent upon a cost-
benefit analysis concluding that the owner of an entitlement is willing to
pay the most for it. All arguments from cost-benefit analysis, even those
proceeding from different assumptions to different conclusions than in
the preceding paragraph, make the ownership of real property contingent
upon specific facts. A corrective justice argument, in contrast, would
probably begin from the premise that the right of the owners of Black-
acre to be free from the danger created by burning the fields at Whiteacre
is grounded in an initially just distribution that is not contingent on the
outcome of a cost-benefit analysis. This account of corrective justice,
however, might leave many questions undecided. The efficiency analysis
would show how to decide these open questions so as to maximize the
value of the basic rights defined in the underlying theory of distribution.
Aristotelian theory provides one way of establishing an initial distri-
bution of wealth. Other ways are offered by alternative philosophies.
For example, societies based upon market capitalism distribute wealth to
people according to the marginal productivity of the resources that they
own, including their labor and capital. I will make no attempt to com-
pare distributional principles or to choose the best among them. Rather,
I want to show in the next section that before the efficiency analysis can
proceed, an initial distribution must be specified that includes ownership
of bodies and property. It is incoherent to suppose that the efficiency
analysis can turn upon itself and prove what it assumes.
B. Pareto Efficiency
Most economic models take efficiency as their objective, especially
Pareto efficiency. A change is a Pareto improvement by definition pro-
vided that someone is made better off and no one is made worse off.
Pareto efficiency is achieved when the scope for Pareto improvements is
exhausted. "Better off" and "worse off" are measured by each person's
well-being relative to a benchmark distribution of resources. The bench-
mark for purposes of policy analysis, referred to as the "initial distribu-
tion" in this article, is usually the status quo distribution of income, but
in principle the benchmark may be any ideal income distribution.
The Pareto criterion is impractical as a guide to policymaking when
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literally construed because it is impossible in practice to identify a policy
change that makes someone better off without making anyone worse off.
It can be modified, however, and extended in ways that are practical.
The standard modification is to allow changes in policy for which the
winners win more than the losers lose. So long as the winners win more
than the losers lose, the former could compensate the latter and still have
more besides. Such a change is called a "hypothetical Pareto improve-
ment" because the Pareto standard can be satisfied in principle by an
appropriate redistribution of the gains.59 The redistribution is, however,
only hypothetical, so this standard allows changes that make some peo-
ple worse off. The standard of hypothetical Pareto improvements is the
foundation of cost-benefit analysis, according to which a change should
be made if the benefits to the winners exceed the costs to the losers.
The initial distribution of resources is the Archimedean point by
which the efficiency analysis is levered. If this point detaches itself and
moves, the comparison of alternative policies in terms of their relative
efficiency becomes incoherent. For example, it is well-known that cost-
benefit analysis only works so long as background prices remain un-
changed; when background prices vary, cost-benefit analysis can yield
incoherent and paradoxical results.60 To keep background prices con-
stant, the fundamental distribution of income must not be disturbed.
The presupposition of an initial distribution of resources, including
legal entitlements, can be located in the logic of the efficiency models of
torts. There are three steps in constructing such a model. First, material
interdependencies must be sketched. Taste and technology are described
in this step. The second step is to establish what people are willing to pay
for torts rights. The prices that people are willing to pay depends upon
their tastes and also upon their ability to pay. Ability to pay depends in
turn upon the distribution of income and wealth. The second step thus
involves allocating resources to people to establish their ability to pay.
After taste, technology, and initial endowments in resources are speci-
fied, alternative tort rules can be compared according to their efficiency.
59. Different concepts of economic efficiency are explained as they apply to the law by Jules
Coleman. See Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophical Aspects of the Economic
Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221 (1980); Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Max-
itization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980).
60. It is well-known that techniques such as cost-benefit analysis are susceptible to grave defects
when background prices can vary. For example, the net benefits of changing from state A to state B
may be positive when evaluated at the prices prevailing in A, and the net benefits of changing back
from B to A may be positive when evaluated at the prices prevailing in B. So a cost benefit analysis
would favor a change from A to B, and also favor a change from B back to A. This is known as
reversibility.
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This is the third step, in which a judgment is reached concerning the
efficiency of different liability rules.
To illustrate how the judgment in the third step presupposes the first
two steps, consider the models of Coase, Calabresi, Shavell, and Landes
and Posner. In their models, the person to whom efficiency requires as-
signing liability is said to have caused the accident. But such a judgment
about efficiency cannot be reached without first specifying how much in-
jurers and victims are willing to pay to avoid accidents. A person may be
willing to pay a lot more for a right if she is rich rather than poor. Thus
people's willingness to pay depends upon their wealth as determined by
the initial allocation of resources.
When questions of tort law are framed at a sufficient level of gener-
ality, the alternatives being contemplated affect the background prices
that are needed to launch an efficiency analysis. This is true of the ques-
tion, "Why do we own our own bodies?" It is also true of questions con-
cerning large effects upon income and wealth. For example, "Why not
allow the poor to expose the chattels of the rich to risk with impunity?"
Or, "Why does a person own the product of his labor and capital?"
Although an efficiency analysis cannot effectively explain or justify
basic tort rights, once these rights are recognized as premises, an effi-
ciency model can say a lot about how to increase their value. Given that
people own their own bodies, should this right be protected by a rule of
strict liability or negligence? If the right is violated, how should compen-
satory damages be computed? If the right is intentionally violated,
should punitive damages be allowed? What standard of proof should the
plaintiff have to meet? If these questions are answered by identifying and
adopting efficient legal rules, the value of the underlying rights will be
maximized.
C. Union of Liberty and Efficiency
These arguments suggest how to think about economic and legal
conceptions of cause in torts. Many forms of behavior are interdepen-
dent. When one person's behavior affects the well-being of another, there
is a material externality. Any society must adopt standards regulating
such behavior. These standards must balance the freedom of each person
to act and the responsibility of each person not to harm others. A soci-
ety's conception of freedom and responsibility is embodied in an initial
allocation of legal rights. These rights must be protected and adjusted to
particular situations. The efficiency analysis takes the distribution of ba-
sic rights as given and identifies forms of protection and adjustment that
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will maximize their value. Pareto efficiency is, thus, the natural comple-
ment to a theory of liberty as applied to the law of torts.
Different societies adopt different conceptions of liberty as embodied
in their tort rules, and the same society may change its conception over
time. Efficiency analysis presupposes a conception of liberty to specify
the initial distribution of basic tort rights, but the efficiency analysis is
consistent with many different conceptions of liberty. There are, how-
ever, some conceptions of liberty that fit better with the efficiency analy-
sis than others. 6 1 Because Pareto efficiency measures the value of an
entitlement according to how much people are willing to pay for it, the
Paretian approach is based upon valuations by individuals. This ap-
proach fits best with individualistic theories of liberty.
To illustrate, in his magisterial book A Theory of Justice,62 Rawls
developed a concept of the person in which rational people are viewed as
pursuing life-plans for personal development. Pursuing such a plan re-
quires legal freedom and material resources. Tort law would be espe-
cially appropriate for such people if it were designed to prevent them
from interfering with each other's exercise of basic liberties, and if this
protection of the basic liberties were achieved at minimum cost in terms
of material resources. Thus the conception of tort law as the union of
liberty and efficiency fits well with the conception of the state as an in-
strument to enable people to pursue their rational life-plans.
Another example of a close fit between this conception of tort law
and a prominent theory of liberty is provided by Nozick's Anarchy, State,
and Utopia.63 According to this book, basic tort rights are natural rights.
The state is constructed, according to this theory, not to create these
rights, but to recognize and protect them. The main reason for public
protection, rather than private protection, is that government can pro-
vide more secure protection at lower cost. In this theory, the goals of the
state sort neatly into the two categories of recognizing natural rights and
protecting them efficiently, which corresponds to the two aspects of the
conception of tort law embodied in the union of liberty and efficiency.
61. Communitarian theories do not fit because many theorems in economics require for their
truth a substantial separation of utility functions. To illustrate, consider a religious community
whose conception of the true faith involves the detailed regulation of the beliefs and behavior of its
members. The members of such a community will have strong preferences about the beliefs and
behavior of other members of the community. Insofar as these preferences affect behavior and evalu-
ations of it, the utility functions are separable. So the model of perfect competition would have
limited value as a predictive or evaluative technique when applied to the members of such a religious
community whose utility functions are truly independent.
62. J. RAWLS, supra note 57.




Bertrand Russell's observation that "cause" tends to disappear from
scientific discourse describes the efficiency analysis of tort law. In the
efficiency models, causal relations are precisely described in mathemati-
cal functions that characterize material externalities. The models are
used to identify legal rules that create incentives for efficient behavior.
Behavior falling within the scope of liability under these rules can be
called the legal cause of the harm under an efficiency norm.
The efficiency analysis presupposes an initial distribution of re-
sources, including the fundamental legal rights created by tort law.
These fundamental rights embody a conception of liberty that balances
freedom and responsibility. The efficiency analysis shows how to maxi-
mize the value of these basic rights. Understanding tort law as the union
of liberty and efficiency reconciles two opposing thedries of it. Theorists
concerned with defining liberty should admit that increasing its value is
an important goal of the courts, and the practitioners of the efficiency
analysis must acknowledge that it presupposes an initial allocation of
normative resources. So it seems that Russell was only half right (or
only half wrong). The disappearance of cause from economic models of
tort represents in part scientific progress and in part the suppression of
fundamental philosophical issues.

